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A movement is under way that will, if successful, 
redefine the fundamental principles of representation in 
the United States. It is prompted by a public opinion 
that expresses an unmistakable dissatisfaction with the 
performance and characteristics of the United states 
Congress (Struble and Jahre 1991). Combined with 
astoundingly high incumbent re-election rates, these two 
variables have resulted in a sense of genuine frustration 
held by the American people. Desiring change but 
doubting that Congress is able to heal itself, the public 
has taken the responsibility upon themselves. In 
populist fashion, the public has initiated mandatory 
change in the model of representation. The means to 
reform have been found most often in legislative term 
limitations. Automatic rotation measures have already 
been endorsed through referendums in Oklahoma, Colorado, 
and California as the voters of those states have 
restricted the re-eligibility of their state 
legislatures. The voters in Colorado, in fact, voted to 
limit the terms of their congressmen, the first such 
successful move in the country (although the 
constitutionality of the provision is being decided in 
1 
court). Talk of congressional term limitations has now 
become commonplace as proposals have been offered by 
several state legislatures, public protection 
organizations, and even special interest groups. 
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While public opinion has shown that three-fourths of 
adults support limiting the careers of their congressmen, 
the ramifications of such measures are not so clear 
(Copeland and Rausch 1991). Though many have tried, it 
is difficult to accurately predict the effects of 
congressional term limitations. This uncertainty is due 
in large part because they effect the relationships 
between the public and their representatives, between 
Congress and other institutions in government, and also 
between the members of Congress themselves. Some argue 
that term limitations are a simple remedy that is long 
overdue; a necessity to cure the ills of an institution. 
Others are offended by the bluntness of its instrument 
and by the thought of having their democratic choice 
automatically restricted. 
To the student of constitutional politics, this 
debate is nothing short of stimulating. It has all of 
the aspects of the fundamental democratic issues that 
were debated in public forum during the drafting of the 
Constitution. It is a question that balances ideals and 
necessities, political theory and practical effects. 
Truly, it is an issue of constitutional importance. And 
for that reason, this study examines the original debate 
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over term limitations waged amongst the framers of the 
United States Constitution. An analysis of their 
political theories on rotation in Congress will allow the 
contemporary movement to be put into perspective. 
Too often overlooked in the modern debate over 
congressional term limitations has 'been the reasoning 
employed by the founding fathers in their a~tempt to 
create an' ideal model'of governme~t. Unlike studies that 
speculate the political ramifications of term limitations 
or others that debate whether their use is right or 
wrong, this study attempts to determine if the founding 
fathers provided ari explanation for the circumstances 
that have motivated the current term limitation movement. 
Specifically, Federalist and Anti-federalist theory is 
searched for a resolution to the troubling paradox 
created by the inability of the public to rotate the 
membership of a Congress that they are so disgruntled 
with. It is the thesis of this study that,, in fact, 
Federalist theory on congressional rotation can resolve 
the paradox. The closeness of the public with their own 
representatives created by RE-ELIGIBILITY, a relationship 
predicted by the Federalists, accounts for the reluctance 
of voters to replace incumbents despite their negative 
attitudes towards Congress. 
Three individual components contribute ,to the 
construction of this study. Chapter Two is a study of 
the uses of term limitations in this country before the 
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Constitutional Convention. Automatic rotation provisions 
in early state constitutions and also in the Articles of 
Confederation are examined. This will establish the 
theoretical roots for the use of term limitations and 
also a background of the variety of their use. Chapter 
Three consists of an examination of Federalist and Anti-
federalist political theory on.rotation in Congress, 
which provides the bulk of this study. Theories on the 
necessity of term limitations.are extracted from the 
original debate at the Constitutional Convention and 
during the battle for ratification. Opinions on matters 
such as rotation in office, social· choice theory, 
competency in the electorate, accountability in 
representation, and corruption in government contribute 
to the building of the early theory on term limitations. 
Finally, Chapter Four completes the study with an 
application of the original debate to current trends in 
congressional rotation. It is determined if the founders 
had a realistic conceptualization of the system they 
created, and whether their theories are applicable to the 
contemporary constitutional debate. A conclusion 
searches for an answer to the modern paradox created by 
the public's inability to instigate change in a Congress 
they are disgruntled with, despite given the opportunity 
during each election. 
Completion of this study will provide answers to 
several questions raised in the contemporary debate over 
the necessity of automatic rotation in Congress. 
Establishing the theoretical roots of term limitations 
and citing examples of their early use will provide an 
historical background to current deliberations. Most 
importantly, examination of the original constitutional 
debate over congressional rotation will provide not only 
insight into the intentions of the framers, but also a 




EARLY USE OF TERM LIMITATIONS 
IN AMERICA 
Term limitations have recently been celebrated as an 
innovative tool in which to combat the evils of 
contemporary legislative bodies. Proponents argue that 
such measures are reforms desperately needed to correct 
current trends of sluggish representational turnover. 
Opponents are shocked by such proposals and find term 
limitations repugnant and insulting to America's 
democratic tradition. The debate continues over the 
speculated benefits and dangers of these "innovations." 
Sometimes neglected in this debate is the history of 
the automatic rotation principle in this country. 
Unknown to many that are involved in the current debate, 
legislative term limitations enjoyed widespread use 
during this nation's formative years. Because numerous 
aspects of the representational model of gov~rnment were 
still unknown at that time, such provision~ were often 
used to systematically prevent the evils that were feared 
when men were placed in positions of authority. Term 
limitations were used in several state governments and 
also in Congress,under the Articles of Confederation. 
This chapter briefly examines the use of term 
6 
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limitations in this country up to the Constitutional 
Convention in the summer of 1789. The goal is to 
establish the original philosophy behind the use of term 
limitations, thereby promulgating the reasoning that 
contributed to the constitutional debate. Initially, an 
examination of the theoretical roots that led to the 
implementation of term limitations is presented. To 
observe specific rotation provisions, an examination of 
the various uses of term limitations in the states 
follows. Finally, a study of congressional term 
limitations under the Articles of Confederation completes 
the pre-convention examination of the rotation principle. 
This chapter -serves to provide a foundation of automatic 
rotation theory, and also to familiarize,the reader with 
term limitation use prior to the Constitutional 
Convention. 
Theoretical Roots 
Early statesmen oftendebated in public forum the 
"science" of politics and the proper use of governmental 
power. Their arguments were composed of political 
history, past·· 'experience, and hypothetical ideals. 
Trying to pinpoint the primary source of term limitation 
theory from such a mosaic is a nearly impossible task. 
There are, however, logical ,themes that can be identified 
as contributors to an early American rotation principle. 
The theoretical roots of term limitations can be found in 
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the principles of the ancient polities, the experience of 
the colonists' and their ancestors with Parliament, and 
finally the colonists' own experience with legislative 
bodies in this country. 
The more lettered scholars of the time often 
referred to the ancient polities and cited early 
republican principles when debating politics. Discussion 
of the necessity of rotation in public office was no 
different. There were, in fact, several experimentations 
with term limitations in the earliest models of 
government (Struble and Jahre 1991). In Athens, the 
Council of 500 served in annual rotation, as did Sparta's 
Board of Five Ephors. Until the first century B.C., the 
Roman republic rotated their tribunes, magistrates, and 
consuls by forbidding re-election after a one-year term. 
A second term as consul was allowed only after a ten-year 
layoff. There was also use of the rotation principle 
during the Italian Renaissance. For example, the inner 
circle of the republic of Venice was rotated annually. 
In Florence and the other republics of Tuscany, the 
highest officials were limited to a single term of only 
two months. Historians most often cite a desire to avoid 
stagnation in government as the general reason for 
rotation. 
It was from this early political theory favoring 
rotation in public office that statesmen of this country 
molded their own ideals. Americans had an established 
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preference for representational legislatures, but the 
colonists and their nationalist descendents clearly 
remained cautious of abuses of power. Experience with an 
unconcerned Parliament had created skepticism in many 
Americans towards legislative bodies. Shortly after 
nationhood, dominant governing power settled in the state 
legislatures, prompting many to direct criticisms at 
these bodies. Thomas Jefferson· wrote that "bodies of men 
as well as of individuals, are susceptible of the spirit 
of tyranny," (Adams 1980). Vesting power in collective 
bodies was, in itself, not a comprehensive safeguard 
against abuses of power. A fear of illegitimate use of 
governmental authority led to the conclusion that it 
would be futile to vest power in bodies of men without 
providing reliable means of control. 
Early support of automatic rotation in this country 
has also been tr.aced to the English ra.dical Whigs who 
often voiced concern over the lack of control the voters 
held over Parliament. 
The radical Whigs believed that the corrupting 
of the court was so great that even a member of 
Parliament of the greatest integrity should not be 
exposed to it for more than a year. Therefore, the 
reformers had made it their goal to prevent bribes 
by constantly changing the members of Parliament. 
(Adams 1980) 
A vigorous turnover in the membership of Parliament would 
have keep that body close to the people, maintained its 
responsiveness, and prevented the evils associated with 
entrenchment of officials. 
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Another s.ource of political theory that contributed 
to the support of term limitations has been identified as 
this country's own early r'epublican idealism (Adams 
1980). The fundamental principle of this ideology was 
legitimacy of government, to be 'achieved through consent 
by and participation of the public. ·Republican idealism 
held that rotation ,in· publi_i::: offic.e was desired simply 
because it allowed many citizens to participate in 
government. This was premised.by the belief that many 
people were qualif.ied to serve in public office. 
Frequent turnover of personnel"within government would 
stimulate a large pool of individuals able to serve the 
country or state_ in various capacities. Long-term 
officeholdingwoul<;i not only hinder the growth of that 
pool, but would ultimately shrink it. 
The practical arguments in favor of automatic 
rotation were twofold. The first claimed term 
limitations were necessary to prevent concentration of . . 
power in individuals. There was a significant suspicion 
of professional officeholders and abuses of the public 
trust. "Eighteenth century r~dicals looked upo~ the 
' 
desire for office as a disease which fed upon office-
holding," (Jenson 1963). Term limitations were necessary 
to promote turnover, thereby avoiding power accumulation 
in individuals and the weaknesses of human nature. 
The second argument in favor of term limitations 
stemmed from a desire to avoid an entrenchment of 
factions in the legislative halls of America. 
As a safeguard against factions entrenching 
themselves in Congress, the term of service was 
limited, at the obvious risk of penalizing 
experience. (Montross 1950) 
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Factionalism woulg eminent'ly lead to tyranny by 
oligarchy, or in the least a sluggish, unresponsive 
legislative process. · In this same v~in,, rotation would 
also prevent a ruling class of .elites from forming. It 
was often argued that aristocratic factions could be 
avoided if elected officials were returned to the ranks 
of the people. Short terms and limits. on re-eligibility 
would preclude an unwelcome aristocracy from forming. 
The Use of Term Limitations in the States 
The study of state governments is beneficial because 
they provide observable experimentation of various 
structures and provisions concerning the use of 
authoritative power. This is true for scholars of today 
as well as for politicians two centuries ago. Variations 
in state governments were as numerous as the states 
themselves. Automatic rotation provisions were common in 
early state governments and an examination reveals how 
' ' 
the founders dealt with concerns related to turnover in 
public office. 
State officials implemented term limitations for 
reasons similar to those established above. A related 
technique for dealing with entrenchmertt in government was 
the use of short legislative terms. Forcing 
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representatives to face their constituencies in frequent 
and periodic elections provided a latent check on power 
accumulation. During the colonial period, there had been 
a precedent set for annual elections of legislative 
assemblies. "Where annual elections end, there slavery 
begins," was the belief (Adams 1980). 
After independence, all of the states originally 
imposed a one-year term on their representatives. The 
exception was South Carolina which allowed a two-year 
term. Early state senators and governors were. also 
subject to periodic elections but often enjoyed somewhat 
longer terms. Table I, found on page 13, presents the 
various terms of office established in the original state 
constitutions. 
Short terms of office did not satisfy the most 
ardent proponents of rotation. They argued that annual 
elections, of themselves, did not adequately check 
legislative entrenchment. Their logic was substantiated 
by the fact that terms of office as high as 19, 33, and 
even 50 years had been recorded in colonial assemblies 
(Adams 1980). 
Power accumulation and faction entrenchment had not 
been controlled by short terms alone. To curb these 
trends, many state constitutions provided limits on re-
election to public offices, especially those that were 
considered sources of power. More attention was directed 
to the offices of senator and governor than to the 
TABLE I 
TERMS OF OFFICE FOR REPRESENTATIVES, SENATORS, AND 
GOVERNORS IN THE STATES AS STIPULATED 
IN ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS 
Representatives Senators Governors 
New Hampshire 1 1 1 
Massachusetts 1 1 1 
Connecticut 1 1 
Rhode Island 1 1 
New York 1 4 3 
Pennsylvania 1 1 
Delaware 1 3 3 
Maryland 1 5 1 
Virginia 1 4 1 
North Carolina 1 1 1 
South Carolina 2 2 2 
Georgia 1 1 
13 
Source: Adams, Willi Paul. The First American 
constitutions. Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1980. 
representatives of the lower house of the state 
assemblies. 
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Virginia's constitution was the first to contain 
restrictions on re-election. According to its 
constitution, a senator could not be re-elected until a 
four-year ~eriod had .elapsed, and every year, one-fourth 
of the senate would be newly-elected. The governor of 
Virginia, after serving a one-year term, could be re-
elected twice but then had to wait four years before 
running for the office again. Pennsylvania was the only 
state to restrict the re-election of members of the lower 
house. It's representatives served a one-year term with 
re-election possible for a total of three years in any 
seven-year period. Six states limited re-eligibility to 
the offices of she~iff, coroner, and governor. Three 
states, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, 
possessed no rules for automatic rotation in public 
office. None of the constitutions provided for the 
recall of legislative or ~~ecutive officials during their 
terms. Table II, on page 15, presents term limitations 
as established in the original state constitutions. 
Table II reveals that term limitations were 
commonplace in the states immediately after nationhood. 
Because dominant governing power had settled in the lap 
of state governments at that time, the legitimacy of the 
rotation principle was clearly established. 
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TABLE II 
ROTATION IN OFFICE AS STIPULATED IN STATE 
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constitutions. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1980. 
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The Articles of Confederation 
Term limitations became a variable in national 
politics upon ratification of the Articles of 
Confederation. The governing apparatus set up soon after 
independence reflected the suspicious ideology held by 
many Americans towards oppressive and unresponsive 
legislatures. The framers, with the atrociti~s incurred 
under the English Crown still very much on their minds, 
were careful not to yield too much authority to the new 
national government. In addition to very limited powers, 
the new model of government included a structural check 
on legislative entrenchment. This section examines the 
original congressional term limitation established under 
the Articles of Confederation and its effectiveness. 
It is necessary to briefly examine the governing 
mechanism of the Continental Congresses that met prior to 
ratification of the Articles of Confederation in 1781. A 
study of its nature can contribute to the understanding 
of the rotation principle. These national assemblies 
were semi-representative legislative bodies. Delegates 
typically possessed a paper commission which certified 
their right to a seat in a particular Congress. The 
nature of the assignment reflected the fact that the 
delegate served at the pleasure of the selecting body, 
usually the state assembly. 
Two aspects inherent in the delegate's assignments 
relate to this study of term limitations. The first is 
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the specified period of assignment to a particular 
session of Congress. Although commissions could be 
renewed, technically, these assignments were not open-
ended. While they did not provide for rotation 
specifically, these commissions did reflect the ideal of 
the finite legislative term. The other important aspect 
was the direct accountability of the delegate to the 
assigning body. Delegates to Congress had a clearly 
defined mission to voice and protect the interests of the 
state. The combination of these two aspects established 
-a representative relationship of limited nature in which 
there were close ties between the assigning body and the 
delegate. 
The same reasoning that went into the structuring of 
term limitations in the state constitutions led to 
support of similar provisions in the construction of the 
Articles of Confederation. Most Americans favored the 
representational legislative model, but for various 
reasons were still skeptical of these bodies. To review, 
their suspicions stemmed from a distrust of 
professionalized politicians and the concentration of 
power which resulted. The other argument centered around 
the desire to prevent entrenchment of factions and an 
aristocracy. These political ideals led to 
implementation of very specific limitations on terms of 
offices in Congress under the Articles of Confederation. 
Benjamin Franklin's sketch for the new national 
18 
government was one of the earliest models that called for 
congressional term limitations. Franklin's plan, drafted 
in 1775, included annual elections of delegates and 
automatic rotation of membersh~·p in Congress. Both 
principles were common in other proposals that followed 
Franklin's plan and "was thought to be a means of 
preventing jealousies," (Thorpe 1970). Franklin's plan 
is important because it became the primary source for the 
report given to Congress on J~ly 12, 1776, by the 
committee appointed to prepare the Articles of 
Confederation. The committee's final repo~t was 
eventually authored by John Dickinson of Pennsylvania. 
The Dickinson plan provided the model of government 
debated until the Articles were ratified in 1781. 
Dickinson's plan est~blished strict accountability of 
congressmen by reserving to each state the right to 
recall its delegates at any time within the year they 
were elected and to send n~w qnes in their place. To 
ensure vigorous rotation in Congress, no person could be 
a delegate for more than three years in any six-year 
period. During ratification, the South Carolina 
delegation had offered an amendment which failed that 
would have increased the rotation provision to two years 
in any six (Thorpe 1970). Both of the original proposals 
from the Dickinson draft were eventually included in 
Article Five of the new Articles of Confederation. 
For the convenient management of the general 
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interests of the united states, delegates shall be 
annually appointed in such manner as the 
legislature of each state shall direct, to meet in 
Congress on the first Monday in November, in every 
year, with a power reserved to each state, to 
recall its ~elegates, or any of them, at any time 
within the year, and to send others in their stead, 
for the remainder of the year. 
No state shall.be represented in Congress by 
less than two, nor by more than seven members; and 
no person shall be capable of being a delegate for 
more than three years in any term of six years .... 
(Article 5, Articles of Confederation, 1781) 
As a reflection of the framers' commitment to 
rotation, Article Nine provided that no person was 
allowed to serve as President of Congress for a term 
longer than one year in any three-year period. This 
would ensure that no one would acquire oppressive powers 
as head of the national government. 
Accountability in representation was established by 
Article Five. Through the recall and rotation 
provisions, the delegates were forced to be responsive to 
the wills of their electorates, the state legislatures. 
This explains why many votes in Congress, while 
reflecting a state's interest, were often inconsistent 
with a delegate's personal political and economic views 
(Jenson 1963). 
Several interesting anecdotes were recorded of the 
implementation of Article Five. It appears that 
application of the rotation principle was not as simple 
as expected, primarily due to a nonchalant attitude 
towards the term limitation. The stories reveal not only 
surprising behavior in Congress, but also the perverted 
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use of Article Five. 
Samuel Osgood had stirred up such enmity in his 
efforts to save the country that he became the 
first delegate to be actually ousted on the grounds 
of having served three years since March 1, 1781. 
The members of his faction contested the decision 
to no avail, and on nis way home the ex-member 
wrote to Gerry: 'Farewell all connection with 
public life. I am inexpressibly disgusted with 
it.' The ax fell next on· the two Delaware 
delegates, James Tilton and Gunning Bedford, Jr. 
But when it came the turn of Howell and Ellery of 
Rhode Island, both fought back so furiously that 
the motion to unseat them lacked seven votes of 
carrying. Secretary Thomson mentioned that the 
debates 'were conducted with a good deal of 
warmth.' And James Monroe wrote on May 25th: 'I 
never saw more indecent conduct in any assembly 
before.' (Montross 1950) 
Term limitations, while common in the states, were 
still a novelty in national politics. It would require 
time before they were accepted as part of the political 
environment. The tales continue, disclosing that 
enforcement was not pUtomatic and was often motivated by 
personal political agendas. 
In the spring of 1784 this provision was used as a 
weapon by every faction in Congress to get rid of 
troublesome opponents. pavid Howell, one of the 
last to be selected as a victim by the committee 
of investigation, reported on May 22nd to Governor 
Jabez Brown of Rhode Island: 'I have been in hot 
water for six or seven weeks, ever since business 
has been taken up in earnest. Thank God, we have 
hitherto carried every ~ointw I have received two 
written challen9es to f1ght duels; one from Col. 
Mercer, of Virg1nia, the other from Col. Spaight, 
of No. carolina .... I answered them that I meant to 
chastise any insults ~ might receive and laid their 
letters before Congress.' (Montross 1950) 
Since the Articles of Confederation were not 
ratified until 1781, the term limitation provision did 
not take effect until 1784. In that first year, there 
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were a handful of delegates who became ineligible for re-
election. According to one scholar, Article 5 would have 
been, for the most part, irrelevant to the makeup of 
Congress during these early years (Rakove 1979). 
Turnover was at such a high rate naturally, that 
implementation of Article Five was trivial. During the 
period from 1774 until 1783, a period encompassing the 
revolution and parts of the confederation era, there were 
235 delegates who attended Congress for a minimum of four 
weeks during any one calendar year. Fifty-six delegates 
attended Congress for one year only, while another sixty-
five attended Congress for two years. Fifty-three 
delegates attended Congress for three years. Thus:' 
fully three-quarters of the active wartime 
membership of Congress were present during each of 
three years or less. On the other hand, only 
thirty-one delegates, or one-eighth, served in 
Congress during each of five calendar years or 
more. By the end of 1776, more than half of those 
who attended Congress prior to the Declaration of 
Independence.had left its chambers for good. 
(Rakove 1979) 
There are several factors that contributed to a 
naturally high rate of tu~nover. Most members left 
Congress of their own accord for various reasons. A few 
delegates who had'resisted the independence .movement left 
in protest. Because the authority of the national 
government was limited, several delegates left Congress 
seeking more prominent positions in state governments. 
Still others had accepted military appointments and opted 
to leave Congress, while a few had left to join the 
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diplomatic corps abroad. A large number voluntarily left 
Congress to return home and care for pressing family or 
estate matters. Being a delegate ~o Congress meant 
travelling long distances and being away from home for 
long periods of time. During this era, politics was 
often a pastime rather than a primary career as service 
was a function of social status or civic responsibility. 
It was far easier to put in one's required time at 
Congress then leave having learned' the office was 
a mark of distinction but not a politipal objective 
worth pursuing in a serious way or for any length 
of time. So long as most delegates thought their 
attendance a concession to patriotism rather than 
the fulfillment of their ambitions, Congress would 
be condemned to muddling through to independence. 
(Rakove 1979) 
Whatever the reason for leaving Congress, the aggregate 
effect was a naturally high rate of rotation in 
membership. "The members of Congress are so perpetually 
changing that it is of little use to give you their 
names," wrote R.H. Lee in a letter home in 1778 (Rakove 
1979). 
There is little argument that election competition 
or state legislative displeasure were major causes of. 
rotation. According to eighteenth century political 
etiquette, "most delegates who were willing to retain 
their positions in Congress were not likely to be turned 
out of office," (Rakove 1979). Delegates who refused re-
election far outnumbered those who lost their seats 
involuntarily. Indeed, states were grateful to find 
people to serve repeatedly. Delegates who served 
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multiple terms within the confinement of Article Five 
were not criticized for lusting after power or acquiring 
national interests. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the theoretical background 
of term limitations and has examined their early use. 
The philosophical roots of term limitations were found in 
the examples of the ancient polities, the principles of 
the English radical Whigs, and this country's own. 
experience with unresponsive governments. Rotation in 
office was desired for what it provided as well as what 
it prevented. constant circulation of government 
officials would result in a surplus of competent civil 
servants from which creative ideas and enthusiastic 
service could be extracted. At the same time, rotation 
would prevent the con~entration of power into the hands 
of individuals resulting from accumulated years in 
office. Additionally, the growth of factions in American 
politics could be slowed by preventing their 
entrenchment. These are a sample o.f the theoretical 
arguments that supported the use of term limitations 
during the early years of nationhood. 
The principle of automatic rotation first took root 
in early state governments. This i~ significant because, 
at that time, state governments were the seats of power 
in the American model. The state's use of term 
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limitations established the familiarity of the rotation 
principle in this country, eventually legitimating such 
provisions. The acceptanc~ of term limitations was 
confirmed by their inclusion in the remodeled national 
government under the Articles-of Confederation. 
Ironically, naturally high rates of turnover meant that 
the potential effects of congressional term limitations 
were never realized. Entre~chment of individuals and 
factions was avoided as a product ~f natural rotation, 
not necessarily because of the mandatory term 
limitations. But, regard~ess of 'the effectiveness of the 
rotation principle, the use of term limitations had 
become part of national politics. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE OVER 
THE NECESSITY OF TERM LIMITATIONS 
Chapter Two established the commonality of term 
limitations in the pre~Constitution era. By 1787, the 
rotation principle had clearly become a variable in 
American politics. In light of their broad ideological 
base and extensive use at both the,state and national 
level, a continuation of term limitations would be 
expected despite efforts to reform the national 
government. The republican idealism described in Chapter 
Two and the continued apprehension of several statesmen 
towards the creation of an overly strong national 
government predict continued use of this restraining 
mechanism in the new Constitution. Surprisingly, 
congressional term limitations were not written into the 
Constitution or worked into the intricate balance of 
powers. 
This chapter reviews the Convention's consideration 
of term limitations, and examines the contending 
arguments for the use of automatic rotation in the 
restructured Congress. James Madi~on's notes on the 
federal Convention will serve as the record of the 
debates during the drafting of the Constitution. 
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Opposing theories over the necessity of term limitations 
will be extracted from the volatile ratification debates 
that followed the Convention. Completion of Chapter 
Three allows the contemporary term limitation debate to 
be placed within the original theoretical framework 
provided by the Federalists and Anti-federalists. 
The Constitutional Convention of 1789 
The debate that occurred when the Convention voted 
to remove term limitations from Congress must have been 
intense. The political elites re~evaluating the 
effectiveness of the model,of national government were 
men of vehemently held opinions, and by excluding the 
rotation principle, they moved away from,an established 
norm. According to the journal of James Madison, 
however, there was scarce debate concerning legislative 
term limitations at the Constitutional Convention. 
Nonetheless, the Convention did not go without 
recognition of term limitations. Often overlooked in the 
debates at the Constitutional Convention is that the 
Virginia plan, proposed by Edmund Randolph,, originally 
included legislative term limitations. 
Resolved that the members of the first branch of 
the National Legislature ought to be elected by the 
people of the several States; ... to be incapable of 
reelection for the space of after the 
expiration of their term of service, and to be 
subject to recall. (Mr. Randolph's 4th Resolution, 
proposed May 29, 1787, in Convention; Madison, 1987) 
Randolph's proposal was a reflection of the Articles of 
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Confederation's limit on congressional re-eligibility and 
provision for recall of delegates by the states. 
Interestingly, the Virginia plan called for 
automatic rotation only in the lower house. The upper 
house of the national legislature was to provide 
stability in the new government and thus required longer 
tenure of its members. Ironically, early state 
constitutions had targeted the upper houses of their 
legislatures for use of term limitations. It was 
believed that political corruption lurked in the senates 
of the states because those bodies were generally more 
prestigious than their companion lower houses. 
Randolph's plan for term limitations has received 
little attention in the literature relating to the 
Constitutional Convention. This is probably because the 
provision was soon deleted by the delegates. Few authors 
mention, let alone discuss, the fact that the Convention 
eliminated term limitations from the draft. Madison, 
himself, only mentioned'the vote to exclude term 
limitations in nonchalant fashion. 
On question m~ved by Mr. Pickney for striking out 
'incapable of reelection into 1st branch of Nat. 
Legisl. for , years, and subject to recall' 
agd. to nem. con7 (June 12 Madison, 1987) 
There was no debate reco~ded by Madison on the 
issue, just record of the unanimous agreement. Because 
Madison's notes are generally thought to be the most 
meticulous and comprehensive record of the Convention, it 
is assumed that no worthy debate occurred as to the 
point. In The Report of the Committee of the Whole On 
Mr. Randolph's Propositions, an updated version of the 
Virginia Plan presented the next day, there was no 
reference of the congressional term limitation. Quite 
simply, the automatic rotation principle had been 
abandoned by the political elites of America with 
seemingly little effort or concern. 
28 
The other maj'or proposal of the Convention, the New 
Jersey Plan, called only for a revision of the Articles 
of Confederation. Adopted as proposed, the New Jersey 
Plan would have left intact the term limitations provided 
for under Article 5. The plan also proposed the election 
of a federal executive by the Congress, to consist of 
multiple persons who were to be ineligible for election a 
second time. The New Jersey Plan's call for a revision 
of the Articles of Confederation was soon abandoned as 
the Convention turned to,the business of replacing them. 
Patterson's plan for continued congressional term 
limitations was expunged with the antiquated Articles. 
For four months the Convention debated several 
delicate matters of American government. But, there was 
' ' 
little other specific mention of congressional term 
limitations in Madison's journal. Late in the summer, 
there were a few last ditch efforts to breathe life back 
into the automatic rotation principle.' On August 14, 
Elbridge Gerry read a resolution of the Legislature of 
Massachusetts: 
passed before the Act of Congress recommending the 
Convention, in which her deputies were instructed 
not to depart from the rotation established in the 
5th Art: of Confederation. (Madison 1987) 
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Again, there was no debate recorded as.to the specific 
principle of automatic rotation. In this case, a state 
government was protecting its authoritative territory by 
showing caution of power concentration at the national 
level under the new plan. 
On September 15, the last day of deliberations 
before the delegates put their signatures to the 
document, Gerry took the floor to read his personal list 
of grievances of the proposed Constitution. First among 
them was, "the duration and re-eligibility of the 
Senate," (Madison 1987). Gerry's late reservation, most 
surely held by other delegates as well, hinted at the 
intensity of the debates that were to follow over the 
Constitution's lack of a rotation provision. 
While there was no debate provided in Madison's 
'' 
notes in which to evaluate the framers' views on term 
limitations specifically, there were a number of subjects 
tangent to the issue of rotation i'n office. For example, 
the Convention,waged lively discussion on congressional 
term length, whether the focus of representation was to 
be the people or the states, and also the method for 
selection of congressmen. The most fundamental issues 
relevant to t,his study revolve around public choice and 
the competence of the electorate to make rational 
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decisions. 
During the summer of 1787, there were hints of 
growing sentiment in favor of congressional re-
eligibility. This was expressed in two arguments. First 
was the view that public choice was a sacrosanct matter. 
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, when discussing the age 
requirement of members of Congress, stated that he, "was 
against abridging the rights of election in any shape. 
It was the sam~ thing whether this were done by 
disqualifying the objects of choice, or the persons 
chusing," (Madison 1987). The spirit of his argument 
reflected a respect for the public's choice and an 
unwillingness to tamper with i't. According to this logic 
the public should have the right to choose whom they 
wished to represent them, regardless. 
The second aspect of the growing re-eligibility 
argument involved the public's ability to recognize and 
remove unfavorable legislators. In a debate over term 
length in the Senate, Roger Sherman of connecticut stated 
that, "if they did their duty well, they would be re-
elected. And if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity 
should be allowed for getting rid of them, 1• (Madison 
1987). Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, in debating 
whether elected officials should be eligible for other 
positions in government after a specified layoff period 
said: 
Why should we not avail ourselves of their services 
if the people chuse to give them their confidence. 
There can be little danger of corruption either 
among the people or the Legislatures who are to be 
the electors. If they say, we see their merits we 
honor the men, we chuse to renew our confidence in 
them, have they not a right to give them a 
preference; and can they be properly abridged to 
it? (Madison 1987) 
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This logic, likewise, supported the public's right to 
retain officials they favored. A clearer debate of this 
re-eligibility ideal is found in the writings of the 
Federalists' and Anti-federalists' during the struggle 
for ratification after the Convention. 
The lack of specific debate on the automatic 
rotation issue pesters students of the Convention. The 
question of why congressio~al term limitations, by then 
an established norm, were not included in the 
Constitution remains unsatisfactorily answered today. 
But rather than trying to construct a debate where one 
does not exist, an attempt will be made to determine the 
reasons for the Convention's deviation from the rotation 
principle. From the study thus far, explanations for the 
abandonment can only be speculated. 
The term limitations proposed in the Virginia Plan 
may simply have been a blind adoption of a provision from 
the Articles of Confederation. After more indepth 
consideration by the delegates, (possibly outside of the 
assembly house in a more informal atmosphere, which would 
explain the lack of Madison's documentation), such 
provisions were deserted. One scholar offered the 
argument that, "No doubt, the mandatory rotation had been 
discredited somewhat by association with the 
Confederation," (Struble 1979). 
Another explanation of the deviation from the 
rotati~n principle centered- around an ideological 
awakening. It has been argued that term limitations: 
clearly reflected the Americans' early commitment 
to the republican principle of rotation in office, 
and in that $ense may also have been a mark of the 
naivete with which they initially weighed the 
merits of experience in government against the 
dangers of entrenched powers. (Rakove 1979) 
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There was a realization by many scholars and politicians 
that congressional turnover came at the expense of 
experience and expertise. Both the recall and rotation 
provisions in Article Five, , "had deprived Congress of 
much experience, and it was agreed that no such provision 
should be embodied in the new plan," (Thorpe 1970, 
vol.I). James Madison, considered to possess one of the 
sharpest minds of the time and to be the Father of the 
Constitution, himself had exhausted his congressional 
eligibility under the Articles of Confederation and was 
forced to withdraw his services. 
Yet another explanation of the lack of term 
limitations in the Constitution can be drawn from the 
high rate of natural rotation experienced in the 
Continental Congresses. Less than one~fourth of the 
membership of Congress had been effected by the term 
limitation, leaving its necessity in question (Rakove 
1979). The rotation principle had taken care of itself, 
leaving no need of a structural provision in the new 
model. 
These are possible explanations of why the 
Convention abandoned congressional term limitations. 
Because of no recorded debates over this issue, 
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political history must be speculated. Luckily, the post-
convention debate provided much more colorful and 
specific ;reasoning of the nature of term limitations. 
The Anti-Federalists' Stand 
The term "Anti-federalists" traditionally refers to 
a group of politicians who held a common task, that being 
to expose the weaknesses and flaws of the Constitution. 
Those concerned with the Constitution's lack of term 
limitations, however, held views from both ends of the 
federal question. Proponents of term limitations 
included Thomas Jefferson as well as Richard Henry Lee. 
Therefore, not everyone who was a proponent of term 
limitations was against the Constitution or could be 
labeled an Anti-federalist. Adding to this confusion was 
the lack of organized effort and the diversity of 
reasoning behind the arguments of the Anti-federalists. 
Because it is an umbrella term, it is sometimes difficult 
to aggregate their arguments into a single Anti-
federalist platform. on the issue of rotation in 
Congress, however, there were similarities in their 
logic. For the purpose of this study, the "Anti-
federalist" stand on rotation in Congress will be 
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presented as a cohesive argument against the lack of term 
limitations in the Constitution. 
A common ingredient of the Anti-federalists' logic 
was a belief that rotation of public officials was good 
in itself. Rotation was a necessary criteria of liberal 
government. In that aspect, Anti-federalist theory was 
very similar to that of the early proponents of term 
limitations in the states and under the Articles of 
Confederation. Both theories held rotation as a 
political ideal. To defend that ideal, the Anti-
federalists relied on reasoning that was theoretical, 
focusing on potential dangers and nebulus benefits. 
The Anti-federalists considered term limitations a 
necessity because of their belief in a naturally 
occurring entrenchment of elected officials. For 
example, An Officer of the Late Continental Army (William 
Findley) argued that the lack of a rotation provision 
would threaten liberty because, "great men may and 
probably will be continued in office during their lives," 
(Storing 1981). Inevitably, politicians would desire to 
remain in office for long,tenures, andre-eligibility 
provided the means to do so. Charles Turner proclaimed 
in the Massachusetts ratifying debates: 
I think it is a genuine power for Congress to 
perpetuate themselves--a,power that cannot be 
unexce~tionably exercised in any case whatever: 
--Know1ng the numerous arts, that designing men are 
prone to, to secure their election, and perpetuate 
themselves, it is my hearty wish'that a rotation 
may be provided for. (Storing 1981) 
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The Anti-federalists warned of the seductive lure 
that power had on human nature. They argued that once a 
man was exposed to a position of authority such as a seat 
in Congress, he would hesitate to ever forfeit it. 
Centinel argued that " ... as there is no exclusion by 
rotation, they may be continued for' life, which, from 
their extensive means of influepce, would follow of 
course," (Storing 1981}. For the Anti-federalists, 
entrenchment of politicians was a matter of fact. 
Anti-federalist theory was premised by these two 
elemental "truths": that rotation of government 
officials was good in itself, and that men would 
inevitably entrench themselves in public office. If 
rotation of public officials was the ideal, then term 
limitations were the mode of attainment. From that 
foundation, their writings demanding automatic rotation 
in Congress naturally categorized themselves into two 
sets. on one hand were those that publicized the 
benefits to society that rotation accrued. The others 
warned of the dangers it avoided. 
One benefit derived from frequent rotation in 
Congress was the circulation of good men in and out of 
office. Brutus wrote: 
A farther benefit would be derived from such an 
arrangement; it would give opportunity to bring 
forward a greater number of men to serve their 
country, and would return those, who has served to 
their state, and afford them the advanta~e of 
becoming better acquainted with the cond1tion and 
politics of their constituents. (Storing 1981} 
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Rotation would create a pool of qualified men able to 
serve in various public capacities. It would also 
increase the opportunity to serve in Congress for more 
people. In a speech at the ratification convention in 
New York, Melancton Smith debated that entrenchment of an 
elite class would deprive others, equally qualified but 
less influential, from participation in government. 
It is a circumstance strongly in favor of rotation, 
that it will have a tendency to diffuse a more 
9eneral spirit of emula-t;.;i.on, and to bring forward 
1nto office the genius and abilities of the 
continent --The ambition of gaining the 
qualifications necessary to govern, will be in some 
proportion to the chance of success. If the office 
is to be perpetually confined to a few, other men 
of equal talents and yirtue, but not. possessed of 
so extensive.an influence, may be discouraged from 
aspiring to it. The more perfectly we are versed 
in the political science, the more firmly will the 
happy principles of republicanism be supported~ 
The true policy of constitutions will be to 
increase the information of the country, and to 
disseminate the knowledge of government as 
universally as possible. If this be done, we shall 
have, in any dangerous emergency, a numerous body 
of enlightened citizens, ready for the call of 
their country. (Storing 1981) 
Rotation would open the doors of government service to 
more Americans, resulting in a larger governing class. 
A related benefit gained through constant turnover 
- of elected officials, the Anti-federalists argued, was 
that knowledge of government affairs would be spread 
throughout the public. "To produce attention, activity, 
and a diffusion of knowledge in the community, we ought 
to establish among others the prin6iple of rotation," 
argued the Federal Farmer (Storing 1981). Exposing more 
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Americans to the governing process logically resulted in 
more Americans being conscious of public affairs. 
Ultimately, rotation would inform the electorate and 
allow them to intelligently monitor government actions. 
The Federal Farmer continued: 
B¥ a change of legislators, as often as 
c1rcumstances will permit, political knowledge is 
diffused more extensively among the people, and the 
attention of the electors and the elected more 
constantly kept alive; circumstances of infinite 
importance in a free country. (Storing 1981) 
For a democracy to be effective required not only that 
the public be active, but that they also be informed. 
Rational public choice was impossible without information 
or political knowledge. This was.true whether the public 
was selecting someone to represent their views in 
Congress, or whether they were evaluating the performance 
of an incumbent at election time. 
The Anti-federalists put equal effort into 
publicizing the dangerous effects of the Constitution's 
lack of congressional term limitations. These arguments 
sometimes resembled propaganda campaigns in their attempt 
to create fear of the new Congress and to build public 
sentiment against the Constitution. 
Many Anti-federalists were wary of the effects that 
factions had on the governmental process. Factions 
resulted in decreased accountability, both of individual 
elected officials to their constituencies and of Congress 
to the public. Federal Farmer, demanding both a recall 
and rotation provision, stressed: 
I repeat it, it is interested combinations and 
factions we are particularly to guard against in 
the federal government, and all the rational means 
that can be put into the hands of the people to 
prevent them, ought to be provided and furnished 
for them. (Storing 1981) 
The faction to be feared most was an aristocracy. 
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With no rotation provision, an elite group of men, using 
the influence of their positions, would entrench 
themselves and their friends in lucrative positions. 
Brutus argued: 
A rotation in the senate, would also in my opinion 
be of great use. It is probable that senators once 
chosen·for a state will, as the system now stands, 
continue in office for life. The office will be 
honorable if not lucrative. The persons who occupy 
it will probably wish to continue in it, and 
therefore use all their influence and that of their 
friends to continue in office. Their friends will 
be numerous and powerful, for they will have it in 
their power to confer great favors; besides it will 
before long be considered as disgraceful not to be 
re-elected. It will therefore be considered as a 
matter of delicacy to the character of the senator 
not to return him again. Every body acquainted 
with public affairs knows how difficult it is to 
remove from office a person who has long been in 
it. It is seldom done except in cases of gross 
misconduct. It is rare that want of competent 
ability procures it. (Storing 1981) 
A related argument raised against the Constitution's 
lack of a rotation provision was that long congressional 
careers would subject elected officials to various types 
of corruption and bribery. Such avarice went hand in 
hand with the entrenchment of an aristocracy. A 
Columbian Patriot wrote: 
There is no provision for a rotation, nor any thing 
to prevent the per~etuity of office in the same 
hands for life; wh1ch by a little well-timed 
bribery, will probably be done, to the exclusion of 
men of the best abilities from their share in the 
offices of government. By this neglect we lose 
advantages of that check to the overbearing 
insolence of office, which by rendering him 
ineligible at certain periods, keeps the mind of 
man in equilibrio, and teaches him the feelings of 
the 9overned, and better qualifies him to govern 
in h1s turn. {Storing 1981) 
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The longer a person served in Congress, the more 
corruption he would be exposed to or have opportunity to 
engage in. 
The basic chord struck upon most often by the Anti-
federalists was the question of accountability in 
government. Their argument was simply that to keep the 
actions of government consistent with the views of the 
people, Congress must be kept representative of the 
people. Frequent rotation of Congress ensured th~t the 
membership would not be long removed from public status. 
From the essays of Brutus: 
But still it is of equal importance that they 
should not be so long in office as to be likel¥ to 
forget the hand that formed them, or be insenslble 
of their interests. Men long in office are very 
apt to feel themselves independent to form and 
pursue interests separate from those who appointed 
them .... For it is to be remembered that there is 
to be a federal city, and the inhabitants of it 
will be the great and mighty of the earth. 
{Storing 1981) 
The aggregated effect of entrenched representatives, 
factionalism, and corruption in government, was 
unaccountability. Each branch of the Anti-federalist's' 
argument furthered the distance between the elected 
official and his electors. Samuel Bryant wrote in a 
Pennsylvania newspaper: 
That strongest of all checks upon the conduct of 
administration, responsibility to the people, will 
not exist in this government. The permanency of 
the appointments, of senators and representatives, 
and the controul the Congress has over their 
election, will place them independent of the 
sentiments and resentment of the people, and the 
administration having a greater interest in the 
government than in the community, there will be no 
consideration to restrain them from oppression and 
tyranny. In the government of this state, under 
the old confederation, the members of the 
legislature are taken from among the people, and 
their interests and welfare are so inseparably 
connected. with those of .their constituents, that 
they can derive no advantage from oppressive laws 
and taxes, for they would suffer in common with 
their fellow citizens; would participate in the 
burdens they impose on the community, as the¥ must 
return to the common land, after a short per1od; 
and notwithstanding every exertion of influence, 
every means of corruption, a necessary rotation 
excludes them from permanency in the legislature. 
(Storing 1981) · 
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To maintain accountability in government, the individual 
voices of Congress must be those of the constituencies, 
not professional politicians. To attain that ideal, 
representatives must come from and return to the public, 
not an elite ruling class. 
Many of the Anti-federalists' concerns were aimed at 
the Senate in particular. The six-year term of office 
raised worries that this body would have aristocratic 
tendencies. An elite ruling class would find a safe 
haven in the upper house away from frequent elections, 
thereby opening the door to all of the evils expressed in 
the Anti-federalists' arguments. 
An attempt has been made to construct a concerted 
Anti-federalist stand against the Constitution's lack of 
a congressional term limitation. One point that stands 
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out is the similarity between the republican idealism 
used to promote term limitations in the states and under 
the Articles of Confederation, and the reasoning applied 
by the,critics of the Constitution. This logically makes 
Anti-federalist theory the next generation of the 
rotation principle ancestry. The similarities between 
the two schools are not surprising considering that 
several of the politicians involved in the ratification 
debates were also involved in the earlier deliberations 
that established both state and national governments. 
The Federalists' Reply 
Discussion of a ''Federalist" theory on rotation in 
Congress is simplified by the concerted effort of their 
argument. Writing under the pseudonym of Publius; 
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison provided 
a detailed defense of the Constitution during the 
ratification debates. Because of the comprehensiveness 
of their work, the Federalist Papers serve as the primary 
source of the Federalists' reply to the criticisms raised 
by the Anti-federalists over the Constitution's lack of 
provisional rotation in Congress. 
The creation of a workable form of republican 
government presented an inherent paradox to the framers 
at the Constitutional Convention. Tenets of liberal 
democracy required that the new government be wholly 
dependent on the people. This meant that government had 
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to be responsive to the public will. But yet, it was a 
goal of the framers to provide long-term stability for 
the political system. The Federalists were aware of the 
tension that existed between these two ideals. Madison 
expressed the difficulty of the situation: 
The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on 
one side not only that all power should be derived 
from the people, but that those entrusted with it 
should be kept in dependence on the people by a 
short duration of their appointments; and that 
even during this short period the trust should not 
be placed in a few, but in a number of hands. 
stability, on the contrary, requires that the hands 
in which power is lodged should continue for a 
length of time in the same. A frequent change of 
men will result from a frequent return of 
elections; and a frequent change of measure from a 
frequent change of men: whilst energy in government 
requires not only a certain duration of power, but 
the execution of it by a single hand. (Hamilton, Jay 
and Madison 1961, 37} 
The Federalists' resolution of the paradox was to 
establish dependency on the people through periodic 
elections. stability, on the other hand, was to be 
provided through governmental careers of adequate length. 
From this logic, a Federalist rejection of term 
limitations can be extracted. 
Unlike the Anti-federalists, the Federalists did not 
hold rotation in Congress to be a fundamental good in 
itself. In fact, they argued that constant turnover 
deprived Congress of valuable qualities. Nor did 
Federalist theory consider term limitations a necessary 
provision to ensure government accountability. To the 
contrary, it was argued that the issues raised by the 
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Anti-federalists were adequately kept in balance by the 
nature of the system. For the Federalists, the high rate 
of rotation experienced under the Articles of 
Confederation had proved term limitations of little 
worth. Consequently, where the Anti-federalists saw a 
need for term limitations, the Federalists were willing 
to rely on the public to provide natural rotation. 
The primary task of the Federalists' was to defend 
the Constitutions's lack of term limitations by 
establishing that there were, in fact, high levels of 
accountability inherent in the system. Madison provided 
the premise from which the Federalists' arguments were 
based: 
we may define a republic to be ... a government which 
derives all its powers directly or indirectly from 
the great body of the people and is administered by 
persons holding their offices during pleasure for a 
limited time period, or during good behavior. 
(Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1961, 39) 
In this definition, Madison established the two 
principles which made Congress accountable to the people 
without the use of term limitations. First, argued the 
Federalists, finite legislative terms would periodically 
force members of Congress before their electors. Members 
would not have permanent appointments so that they could 
act on their own will. Second, congressmen held their 
positions at the pleasure of the people. These two 
principles combined, provided enough accountability to 
make term limitations unnecessary. In a discussion of 
term length, Madison explained: 
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As it is essential to liberty that the government 
in general should have a common interest with the 
people, so it is particularly essential that the 
branch of it under consideration should have an 
immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy 
with, the people. Frequent elections are 
unquestionably the only policy by which this 
dependence and sympath¥ can be effectually secured. 
(Hamilton, Jay and Mad1son 1961, 52) 
Elections, with the allowance of re-eligibility, 
provided accountability through public evaluation of 
performance. Because they depended on a positive 
evaluation from the public to gain re-election, 
congressmen would have to perform their duties to the 
approval of their electors. 
All these securities, however, would be found very 
insufficient without the restraint of frequent 
elections. Hence ... the House of Representatives is 
so constituted as to support in the members an 
habitual recollection of their dependence on the 
people. Before the sentiments impressed on their 
minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced 
by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to 
anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, 
when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and 
when they must descend-to the level from which they 
were raised; ther~ forever to remain unless a 
faithful discharge of their trust shall have 
established their title to a renewal of it. 
(Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1961, 57) 
Members of Congress, if they wished to be returned to 
their positions, would be forced to account for their 
actions as representatives. Madison reasoned: 
they can make no law which will not have its full 
operation on themselves and their friends, as well 
as on the great ~asses•of society .... such will be 
the relation between the House of Representatives 
and their constituents. Duty, gratitude, interest, 
ambition itself, 'are the cords by which they will 
be bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great 
mass of the people. (Hamilton, Jay and Madison 
1961, 57) 
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The Federalists argued that re-eligibility would 
actually strengthen the ties between the Congress and the 
public, moreso than under the rotation principle of the 
Articles of Confederation. 
[the delegates to the existing Congress] are 
elected annually, it is true; but their 
re-election is considered by the legislative · 
assemblies almost as a matter of course. The 
election of the representatives b¥ the people would 
not be governed by the same princ1ple. (Hamilton, 
Jay and Madison 1961, 53t · 
The Federalists believed the people would be more 
critical of their elected officials than the state 
assemblies had been under the Articles of Confederation. 
This would result in a Congress that was more responsive 
to the public will. 
Under Federalist theory, the public, not term 
limitations, was to be the safeguard of their own 
liberty. Through the evaluation and re-election process, 
the people possessed the ultimate authority. Instead of 
term limitations, "a remedy must be obtained from the 
people, who can, by the election of more faithful 
representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers," 
(Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1961, ~4). The public could 
replace only the unwanted members of Congress, instead ·of 
relying on wholesale exclusion, which would bluntly throw 
out the good with the bad. _Madison pointed out that the 
system of checks and balances was merely an auxiliary 
precaution against tyranny: "A dependence on the people 
is, no doubt the primary control on the government," 
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(Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1961, 51). 
Vesting such responsibility in the public must have 
been precluded by a faith in their ability to distinguish 
between good and evil representatives, and then to have 
the ability to remove the undesirables. This required 
that the American people be attentive to public affairs 
and participate in their provided role. The Federalists 
maintained enough confidence in the public, and believed 
in the competence of the electorate to cast them in this 
role. "The citizens of America have too much discernment 
to be argued into ~narchy," wrote Hamilton (Hamilton, Jay 
and Madison 1961, 26). An intelligent electorate could 
monitor the performance of their representative over the 
duration of his term and then determine if re-election 
was desired. In relation to the office of the 
presidency, Hamilton argued: 
With a positive duration of considerable extent, I 
connect the circumstances of re-eligibility. The 
first is necessary to give the officer himself the 
inclination and the resolution to act his part 
well, and to the communit¥ time and leisure to 
observe the tendency of h1s measures, and thence to 
form an experimental estimate of their merits. The 
last is necessary to enable the people, when they 
see reason to approve of his conduct, to continue 
him in the .station in order to prolong the utility 
of his talents and virtues, and to secure to the 
government the advantage of permanency in a wise 
system of administration. (Hamilton, Jay and 
Madison 1961, 72) 
Within Federalist theory, good men should remain eligible 
for public service as long as their constituency was 
satisfied with their performance. 
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Not only did the Federalists argue for re-
eligibility, but they also argued specifically against 
the use of term limitations. They believed that 
automatic rotation deprived Congress of valuable 
resources. Only through a long tenure could a 
representative gain familiarity with the political 
environment and grasp knowledge of the governing process. 
Madison wrote: 
Some portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be 
acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can 
only be derived from public sources of information; 
and all of it will be acquired to best effect by a 
practical attention t9 the subject during the 
period of actual service in the legislature. 
(Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1961, 53) 
Constant rotation of membership would deny Congress of 
essential experience needed to solve the problems faced 
by a growing nation. Thus, term limitations drained 
Congress of both the wisdom of its members and the 
authority of its institution. 
An additional argument against automatic turnover 
in Congress had to do with policy implications. The 
Federalists often defended congressional re-eligibility 
and the six-year term of the Senate on the necessity of 
maintaining stability of policy. They warned of the 
inconsistent legislation that would emanate from a 
Congress in constant rotation, "An irregular and mutable 
legislation is not more an evil in itself than it is 
odious to the people," (Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1961, 
37). Laws that were destined to be continually altered 
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by new members were of little value. Madison reiterated: 
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still 
more calamitous. It poisons the blessings of 
liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the 
peo~le that the laws are made by men of their own 
cho1ce if the laws be so voluminous that they 
cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot 
be understood; if they be repealed or revised 
before they are promulgated, or undergo such 
incessant changes that no man, who knows what the 
law is today, can guess what it will'be tomorrow. 
Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can 
that be a rule, which is little known, and less 
fixed? (Hamilton, Jay and Madiso~ 1961, 62) 
By allowing congressmen to have longer careers, policy 
would not be subject to re-evaluation or new 
interpretation every time membership rotated. 
Policy longevity was crucial in the arena of foreign 
affairs as well. Mutable policy, "forfeits the respect 
and confidence of other nations, and all advantages 
connected with national character," (Hamilto~, Jay and 
Madison 1961, 62). In a period when the United States 
was trying to establish legitimacy in the eyes of the 
world, policy consistency was essential. The country 
could not present a new face to the world everytime 
Congress experienced mass.rotation. 
Constant turnover in Congress would also naturally 
result in an increased role of special interests. 
"Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable 
advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, 
and the moneyed few," (Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1961, 
62). Under the restriction of term limitations, special 
interests would always outlive any congressional career. 
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Inexperienced congressmen, they argued, would nievely be 
led astray by these calculating interests. 
One of the most eloquent defenses of re-eligibility 
in public office was Hamilton's explanation to the people 
of the lack of term limitation on the Presidency. The 
logic was similar to the theory applied to the Congress, 
but its effectiveness warrants mentioning. Hamilton 
first went about t~e task of devaluing the argument that 
rotation was good in itself: He reasoned that, "one ill 
effect of exclusion would be a dimunation of the 
inducements to good behavior," (Ham'ilton, Jay and Madison 
1961, 72). He argued that the strongest incentive to 
good behavior in office was the opportunity to retain the 
position. A second ill effect of term limitations was 
"depriving the community of the advantage of the 
experience gained ... in the exercise of his office." 
Experience in public office was desired, particularly in 
times of crisis. Term limitations ensured that a novice 
would always be at the helm. Hamilton's final argument 
focused on the instability in the administration of 
government that would be brought about by automatic 
rotation. Re-eligibility would establish the 
independence of the official, in the case of the 
President, from the suppression of other branches. This 
argument, extended to the Congress, would posit that the 
most vigorous representation would result only by the 
independence of the legislature from the influence of the 
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executive or judiciary. 
A Federalist theory on the necessity of term 
limitations has been extracted from their debate 
concerning rotation in Congress~ Ultimately, the 
Federalists were willing to rely on natural forces of 
rotation to achieve ideal representation. They were 
clearly against forcing turnover in the.membership of 
Congress as it depreciated the capabillties of that body. 
In fact, the Federalists argued that some amount of 
lengthy congressional service was not only natural, but 
healthy and to be desired. As a result, Federalist 
theory replaced term limitations in Congress with 
periodic elections and re-eligibility. 
Summary 
The Federalists' theory on congressional rotation 
differed from that of the Anti-federalists in an 
elemental way. The Anti-federalists clung to their 
idealism on this issu~, possessing a paranoia over abuses 
in government. Their arguments reflected q sense of 
uncertainty about the uses of governmental power, and 
therefore demanded all means to control it. The 
Federalists' reasoning was based on the experience of the 
past. Their logic proceeded from the assumption that the 
natural turnover ~xperienced under the Articles of 
Confederation had cured Congress of most of the concerns 
raised by the Anti-federalists. The Federalists, 
therefore, were content with natural rotation provided 
through retirement and elections. 
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According to the Anti-federalists, term limitations 
were necessary to maintain accountability of elected 
officials. For the Federalists, the question of 
accountability of government was solved through the 
establishment of finite terms, periodic elections, and 
re-eligibility. Bad effects iri the Congress were 
eliminated by public judgment, not wholesale expulsion of 
membership. 
Everything beyond this must be left to the prudence 
and firmness of the people; who, as they will hold 
the scales in their own hands, it is to be hoped 
will always take care to preserve the 
constitutional equilibrium. (Hamilton, Jay and 
Madison 1961, 32) 
By this logic, the Federalists replaced term limitations 
with periodic elections and re-eligibility. 
The original constitutional debate differed in one 
other elemental way. The Anti-federalists believed 
vigorous rotation in Congress was good in itself. 
Automatic rotation was necessary to attain the most 
effective representation. The Federalists did not agree 
that vigorous, wholesale rotation was necessarily good. 
In fact, constant turnover of membership was a hindrance 
to effective representation. Instead, the Federalists 
favored stability in administration of government and 
longevity of ideas. Thus, not only was some long-term 
congressional service natural, it was desired. Only 
through accumulated service, could expertise in the art 
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of public affairs be developed. 
A few of the members ... will, by frequent 
reelections, become members of long standing; will 
be thoroughly masters of the public business ••• The 
9reater the portion of new members and the less the 
1nformation of the bulk of the members, the more 
apt will they be 'to fall into the snares that may 
be laid for them. (Hamilton, Jay and Madison 1961, 
53) 
Natural forces of rotation and the expelling of 
undesirable representatiori through elections would result 
in the healthiest and ablest Congress. 
Whichever side won the battle over rotation theory 
of Congress is indeterminate. The Federalists, though, 
eventually won the war over ratification of the 
Constitution. Thus, it is within their model that the 
last one-hundred and two Congresses have existed and 
evolved. Examination of t~e history of congressional 
careers will reveal whose theory on rotation was most 
accurate, the Federalists or Anti-federalists. A 
question that has just been re-opened by the current term 
limitation movement. 
CHAPTER IV 
AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN 
CONGRESSIONAL ROTATION 
The founding fathers are often credited for having 
keen insight into the forces that shaped government. It 
is now time to determine if that intuition extended to 
the debate on congressional rotation and the necessity of 
term limitations. It has been shown that the original 
constitutional debate 'was split along very ele~ental 
lines. The Anti-federalists believed rotation of 
representation to be an ideal, and, thus, co'nsidered term 
limitatioDs necessary. For them, automatic rotation was 
the safeguard of liberty._ Quite to the contrary, the 
Federalists warned of the rest~ictive nature of term 
limitations. For the Federalists, some amount of long-
term service was both natural and valuable. While one 
logic stressed the dangers of long tenures, the other 
pointed out the weakness caused by short tenures. It 
remains to be det~rmined which camp held the most 
foretelling vision. 
This chapter examines trends ~n congressional 
rotation throughout the history of the Constitution. 
First, the motivatlons and characteristics of the recent 
movement to implement term limitations on Congress are . 
examined within the framework of the original 
53 
54 
Constitutional debate. Next, a study of congressional 
rotation as defined through techniques of modern 
political science provides a perspective in which to 
apply the early theory. This is followed by a review of 
the political science literature that has attempted to 
explain changes in congressional tenure over time. 
Finally'· critical issues of the original constitutional 
debate are re-examined in light of· both the history of 
congressional rotation and certain aspects of the 
contemporary term limitation movement. Upon completion 
of this exercise, the value and applicability of the 
Federalist's and Anti-federalist's theories to 
contemporary issues of rotation will have been 
established. 
Characteristics of .the Contemporary Movement 
In a movement similar to the campaign of the Anti-
federalists two-hundred years earlier, several 
politicians, scholars, and concerned citizens have called 
for the employment of term limitations across the nation. 
At the root of the current crusade is a frustration with 
modern legislative bodies. In Congress, rising incumbent 
re-election rates and sluggish rotation of membership 
have agitated an already declining public opinion of that 
body. In the recent past, an average of sixty-four 
percent of adults expressed a strong dissatisfaction with 
the performance of Congress (Struble and Jahre 1991). It 
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has been argued that the professionalization of 
congressional service is an aggravating circumstance that 
demands remedy by term limitations. Recent polls show 
that as many as three-fourths of adults support the idea 
of term limitations on Congress (Copeland and Rausch 
1991) • 
Is this an endorsement of Anti-federalist theory? 
Perhaps it is in part. The belief that term limitations 
are a expeditious and simple cure to certain ills of 
legislative bodies is similar. But underneath the common 
ideal of legislative rotation, certain aspects of the 
modern movement and the motivation behind it differ from 
those of the Anti-federalists. 
The contemporary trend has several characteristics 
of note. In most of the states, term limitations were 
originally proposed by citizen initiatives. Of the three 
states that have implemented term limitations on their 
legislatures, (Oklahoma, Colorado, and California) all 
have been through the mechanism of referendum elections. 
Therefore, the entire process has bypassed the 
legislative bodies themselves. This is not surprising 
since legislators would not be expected to support the 
termination of their careers. In contrast though, early 
support of term limitations came from within legislative 
bodies. It was the politicians themselves that demanded 
automatic rotation in Congress. 
Although the term limitation movement has been 
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promoted under the banner of reform, it has a peculiar 
partisan flavor to it. Republican candidates and party 
organizations have been significantly more supportive of 
term limitations than their Democratic counterparts. On 
the national level, 1t is the Republican Party that 
stands to benefit most from limiting the number of years 
that a congressman can serve. Republicans have agonized 
under Democratic control of Congress in recent decades. 
Their efforts to reverse this trend through the polls 
have been hampered by slow rotation and high incumbency 
re-election rates. Political scientist Morris Fiorina 
determined that if re-election rates had not increased 
and the number of marginal districts had not declined, 
Republicans likely would have taken control of the House 
five times in the past quarter century -- 1966, 1968, 
1972, 1980, and 1984 (Kesler 1990). However, decreased 
election competition has decreased the predictability of 
partisan seat swings. 
Clearly, the Republican Party has motive to restrict 
Democratic entrenchment in Congress through the use of 
term limitations. In 1988, the Republican Party made 
term limitations part of its official platform. In their 
most public endorsement, Republican President George Bush 
advocated congressional term limitations in his 1991 
State of the Union Address. At present, the term 
limitation movement is synonymous with the Republican 
Party's agenda. 
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The original proponents of term limitations desired 
their use as a structural check on elected officials. 
The Anti-federalists argued-that automatic rotation would 
make Congress more accountable as an institution and 
result in a higher quality of representation. In 
contrast, modern proponents of term limitations appear to 
have selfish motives.' That is, those promoting term 
limitations today clearly' have,_ something to gain by their 
use. The Republican Party ~easoned that term limitations 
would combat Democratic co_ntro-1 of Congress and_ also make 
congressional races more competitiye, both of which are 
in their interest. While championed under the banner of 
necessary reform for a dege.herating Congress, term 
limitations, in this instance, have been promoted for 
clearly different reasons. 
Tracking Congressional Rotation 
While this study has emphasized both the founding 
and contemporary support of term limitations, the value 
placed on congressional rotation has varied over time 
(Struble 1979). During the period of early nationhood, 
·-
there was significant emphasis placed on rotation in 
Congress, whether provided by structural provision or of 
natural occurrence. Both the Federalist and Anti-
federalist theories described in this thesis supported 
rotation, only at different levels and through different 
means. 
Change in this ideal occurred during the 
administration of Pr~sident Andrew Jackson when the 
spoils system was first extended to the federal 
bureaucracy. Rotation was still idealized, but it 
assumed a different role. Jackson established the 
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practice .. of wholesale turnover in personnel upon the 
inauguration of a'new administration. The mentality, of 
public service had begun to change. Struble argued that: 
the idea that federal offices were spoils to be 
spread amo~g the party faithf~l had a significant 
effect not only on appointive places, but also on 
nomination for elective office. (Struble 1979) 
Strategic withdrawal among incumbents during the 
nomination process was used to pass congressional seats 
to other members of the party. Rotationi as described by 
Struble, was provided within the party apparatus rather 
than the electoril prop~ss. 
The ideal of rotation was further altered during the 
post-Civil War era. Basic social changes such as an 
increased cosmopolitan lifestyle and the growth of a 
business class resulted in more value being placed on 
professionalism in the workplace. Eventually, this new 
ideal reached the Congress· where 'emphasis on rotation was 
replaced with a desire for legislative professionalism. 
Gradually, careerism became the norm as longer tenure was 
required to hone the required political skills. It took 
until the turn of the century for the principle of 
congressional rotation to completely slip into obscurity. 
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But since that time, service in Congress has been defined 
in terms of individual careers. 
The variance in social value placed on rotation is 
clearly reflected in the evo-lution of congressional 
careers. Early careers in' Co~gress were indeed short by 
today's standards. Service in Congress averaged only 
between two and three terms throughout the nineteenth 
century (Polsby 1~68). It has ?een argued that there was 
no professional class of legislat~rs throu~h the 
nineteenth and early part o,f the twentieth centuries 
(Kesler 1990); Today, the figur~s have doubled. The 
average House career is well over five terms as a 
congressman can expect to spen~ nearly eleven years in 
office. The average length of,service in the Senate:is 
slightly less, but stili a,bove t'en years. Figure 1, 
found in Appendix A, traces the increasing ,length of 
congressional careers through the first two centuries. 
- ' 
As can be deducted from Figure 1, there has been a 
near steady increase in.length <of congressional service 
from the beginning. The post-Civil War era served as the 
fulcrum towards a continuous increase in length of 
- - ' 
congressional service.' Today' s congression.al careers 
rival those of Supreme Court Justices in terms of 
longevity. Since World War II, Justices, wl;\o enjoy 
lifetime appointm~nts, have averaged 10.9 years on the 
highest bench (Struble 1979). 
Inversely related to the .increased tenure is the 
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dramatic decrease in the proportion of first-time members 
in each Congress. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the proportion of new members in Congress. 
averaged forty to fi(ty-percent after every election 
(Polsby 1979). The twentieth century has witnessed the 
freshman percentage steadily decrease to the present rate 
which hovers near ten-percent. : These numbers reflect the 
clearest trend in congressional turnover. Without doubt, 
rotation is on the decline and is at an all-time low. 
Figure 2, found in Appendix B, traces tpe decreasing 
freshman membership in Congress. 
The entrenchment of Congress is well documented and 
cannot be mistaken. Clearly, today's congressmen enjoy 
much longer terms of service than did their legislative 
ancestors. Modern congressional rotation can be labeled 
sluggish at best. 
The Anti-federalists were accurate in their 
prediction of congressional entrenchment. But, it must 
be remembered, the Federalists desired some long-term 
service, arguing that it was both natural and valuable. 
Present levels of rotation are "natural,~ having 
occurred without the restriction of term limitations. 
But is ten-percent turnover of membership after each 
election what the founders had in mind? Political 
scientists have been intrigued by the mystery of these 
trends and offer several explanations for their cause. 
Struble put forth the change in value placed on 
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rotation, mentioned above, as the impetus to the decrease 
in congressional turnover (Struble 1979). This 
conclusion led to the Theory of Withdrawals. Strategic 
withdrawal of incumbents during the era when seats in 
Congress were courteously rotated within parties resulted 
in low incumbent defeat rates. Eventually, a trend 
persisted that encompassed changed social attitudes 
,' 
towards rotation and increased success rates of 
incumbents in elections. The antithesis of the early 
rotation principle gradually became the norm. 
The famous revolt against the power of the Speaker 
around 1910, which led to the ,introduction of the 
seniority system,in Congress, was cited by Charles Kesler 
as a primary factor in congressional entrenchment (Kesler 
1990) . Because congressmen were rewarded for long 
tenure, emphasis was placed on returning to Washington. 
Re-election was the only way to acquire a position of 
authority within Congress. Gradually, incumbents 
mastered the art of re-election and rotation in Congress 
slowed as a result. 
David Mayhew argued tbat Congress has becoma less 
affected by electoral tides that come in the fO'rm of 
partisan seat swings. By examining election results over 
time, Mayhew determJned that there had gradually become 
fewer marginal districts in Congress (Mayhew 19,14). If 
fewer congressmen are winning their seats narrowly, and 
if the proportion of open seats per election has 
decreased, then entrenchment naturally follows. Mayhew 
determined that the lack of election competition has 
slowed congressional rotation. 
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Edward Tufte explained the decreasing turnover in 
Congress as being due to the effects of redistricting and 
gerrymandering (Tufte 1973). He a~gued that the 
influence that .incumbents have over the process of 
redistricting has lead directly to the security of their 
seats. Decreased election competition brought about by 
manipulation of voting popul~tions has a·llowed incumbents 
to remain in office for longer tenures, thereby 
decreasing rotation in Congress. 
Nelson Polsby examined what he called the 
institutionalization of the House of Representatives 
(Polsby 1968). He showed that there has been a hardening 
of the boundaries into Congress as length of service in 
the House has increased. Contributing to the 
institutionalization was the -increased complexity of 
internal structure, the specializat~on of duties and 
functions, and the increased role of seniority. 
Mastering the new Congress required h~gher stan~ards of 
pr.ofessionalism. Through institutionalization, Polsby 
argued, the motivation for service in Congress shifted 
from one of public duty to one that was more career-
oriented. As emphasis was placed on remaining.in office, 
incumbents developed increased efficiency in re-election 
methods. The final effect of the institutionalization of 
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Congress was the slowdown in the rotation of membership. 
John Ferejohn posited that an increased flow of 
information out of Washington by incumbents had switched 
the public's primary votin~ cue away from simple party 
identification to incumbency itself (Ferejohn 1977). 
Incumbents maintained visibility and increased 
constituency contacts thro~gh advances in communication 
technology. Hence., incumbents.were able tQ rely on name 
recognition as a means to re-election. . Th.e result has 
been an increase in incumb~nt ret~ntion rates and a 
steady decline _in rotation. 
Richard Fenno discuss'ed what he termed "home style" 
in reference to the behavi~ral changes in congressmen to 
increase contact with theit constituency (Fenno 1978). 
Modern emphasis on careerism has made incumbents increase 
visual ties to ~heir districts as a show of concern for 
the electorate's needs .. BY spending time at home with 
the voters, a congressman could prove how interested he 
was in their needs and of what value he was to them. The 
result has been a positive identification between elected 
official and constituency, typically resulting' in re-
election for the in.cumbent. 
Finally, Morris Fiorina explained how the growth of 
bureaucracy has had a direct _posit~ve effect on re-
election rates (Fiorina 19.77}.. The increased size and 
complexity of the federal government has resulted in an 
increase in the number of problems that .the public 
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encounters as a result of their dealings with the massive 
bureaucracy. The public has increasingly turned to their 
elected officials for problem resolution because their 
congressmen were the ones familiar with the system and 
the Washington environment (after all, they created it!). 
Consequently, as the bureaucracy grew, the time that 
congressmen devoted to individual case work increased. 
At election time, the voters remember the effort that 
their congressmen put out fo~ them and recognize the 
, ' 
value of returning him to Washington. Fiorina argued 
that the voters are better served by an official that has 
been in Washington for a signifiqant length of time and 
has gained both experience_and seniority. The result has 
been increased support for incumbency and decreased 
turnover of membership. 
The aforementioned studies serve as a sample of the 
literature pertaining to r6tation in Congress. Each 
contributed its own explanation of current trends in 
congressional turnover. " However, all were in agreement 
that there has been a growing entrenchment of Congress 
manifested in the form of increasing lengths of tenures, 
decreasing percentages,qf new members, and increasing 
incumbency re-election rates. 
The Rise of a Paradox 
The trends in congressional rotation create a 
troubling paradox when superimposed onto the negative 
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public opinion towards Congress. It was mentioned 
earlier that sixty-four percent of adults were strongly 
dissatisfied with Congress' performance. The inability 
to balance the budget, was.teful spending, salary 
increases, generous privileges provided to members, and 
repeated stories,df corruption from the capitol have all 
contributed to the ·Slumping esteem of Congress. Recent 
publicity of the ease with which-incumbents have won re-
election has only increased the public's indignation. 
But yet, re~ults from the ballot b9x fail to reflect the 
public's frustration. Recently, incumbents in the House 
have been re-elected at a rate of over ninety-percent 
(Struble and Jahre 1991). Senators have enjoyed a 
seventy-five percent return rate. Logic dictates that if 
voters were not satisfied with the performance of their 
elected representatives, they would vote them out of 
office. The pubLic's dis~atisfaction with congress then, 
should materialize in the form of relevant levels of 
rotation. The rota t . i,on f igur~s, however, show exactly 
the opposite. Turnover of membership in Congress has 
slowed down significantly. 
The frustration over Congress has not been 
translated into rotation of membership. This then, is 
the paradox: voters have the means (elections) and the 
impetus (dissatis{action with Congress) with which to 
provide natural rotation in Congress, but fail to do so. 
Instead, the complaints continue and there is a call for 
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provisions to provide automatic rotation. Surveys 
mentioned earlier measured public opinion to be three-
fourths in favor of congressional term limitations due to 
general public disappointment with the performance of 
Congress. 
The studies of Struble, Kesler, Tufte, Polsby, and 
Ferejohn explained· c.ongressional entr'enchment by the 
effects that incumb~ncy has on·el~cfion competition and 
voting behavior. Publicity, ge~ry~andering, and name 
recognition are each means, by which incumbents can 
enhance their chances of re~election. But, these studies 
fall short of explaining why a public so seemingly 
disgusted with their elected officials, fails to vote 
them out of office. The fact is, despite t.he 
advantageous effects of incumbency, the public has the 
opportunity to change Congress every time their 
congressman runs for re-election. Ironically, the 
argument can be made·that inqumbency should increase the 
voters awareness of which.name on the ballot is the 
"rascal" to be thrown out. 
The "throw the rascals (incumbents) out" campaign in 
recent elections has aided the term limitation movement. 
This effort called on voters to provide wholesale 
rotation in congress by simply voting against incumbents .. 
These attacks, also motivated primarily by 
dissatisfactio~, were directed at Congress as an 
institution. But, voters continued to defy their own 
sentiments by retaining their congressmen and not 
reforming Congress through rotation. While aggregate 
public opinion ran high against Congress, local support 
remained behind the individual congressman. 
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Can this paradox be resolve~ by application of early 
constitutional t~eory? The crisis itself may not be 
abated, but the basic reasoning in the original debate 
can define the nature of this perplexing relationship. 
The burden of defense rests with the Federalists since it 
was their system that has presented the paradox. 
The key to resolution of the paradox lies in the 
Federalist's theory on re-eligibility. The Federalists 
argued that under a democra~ic system, the public 
inherently posse$seq the right to continue a 
representative in office for as long as the majority 
wished. Re-eligibility would force elected officials to 
maintain the favor pf the voters. Only by satisfying the 
needs of the electorate could a congressman gain re-
election. 
Modern re-election rates reveal just that situation, 
only exaggerated. Slowed rotation reflects the-voter's 
satisfaction with their own congressmen, regardless of 
any feelings they may have towards Congress as an 
institution. As explained in the studies of Fenno and 
Fiorina, congressmen are doing more for their districts 
than ever before. Fenno argued that constituency contact 
is at an all time high and that congressmen rely on "home 
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style" to create the feeling of a close relationship 
between voters and representative. Fiorina found that 
the effort devoted by congressmen to solving individual 
problems of their constituency in the form of casework 
has increased as the size of the federal bureaucracy has 
multiplied. Also, pork barrel, politics {however 
wasteful) have rewarded the electorate when they returned 
an official to Washington. 
How does re-eligibility cause congressional 
entrenchment? Moving a congressional seat away from 
marginal status requires capturing only a small 
percentage of the vote. As little as five-percent may be 
all that is needed to make a seat ''safe" during the next 
election. This spread has been easily overcome by 
casework or pork barreling. Only five-percent of the 
voters have to benefit from such activity for it to pay-
off in the next election. Therefore, the expansion of 
both types of legislative behavior has led directly to a 
slowdown in congressional rotation. 
The Federalists reasoned that re-eligibility would 
force elected officials to "perform" to their audience's 
satisfaction. The incentive of re-election would compel 
congressmen to remain in touch with their districts, 
rather than being seduced into an aristocratic class made 
up of national politicians. Only in this century has re-
eligibility challenged the original value placed on high 
levels of rotation as congressmen gradually have mastered 
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the art of re-election. The most effective way to ensure 
re-election has been to entice the electorate through 
pork barreling and dedicated case work. 
It has been argued that voters -evaluate their 
congressmen by different criteria than they do Congress 
(Parker and Davidson 1979). Congress is judged on the 
basis of its performance on domestic policy, legislative-
executive relations, and the style and pace of the 
legislative process. Congres~men, _on the other hand, are 
judged prima~ily on the basis of their service to 
constituent~ and their personal ch~racteristics. Because 
Congress is judged by more. sweeping .and stringent 
criteria than .are its members, partly explains why the 
"throw the rascals out" campaign has showed little 
fruition. In 1991, only fifteen incumbents lost their 
bid for re-election in the ~ouse, and one in the Senate. 
These results suggest that while the voters are 
disgruntled with Congress, they are satisfied with their 
congressmen. A more appropriate slogan for this 
phenomenon would be "throw the rascals out, except mine." 
The Federalists may not be completely satisfied with 
the characteristics of th~ modern Congress, but they can 
rest assured that their theory on re-eligibility was 
accurate. This study has shown how re-eligibility has 
actually decreased, congressional rotation. As a function 
of that relationship, representatives are closer to the 
voters than ever before~ The paradox then, is resolved: 
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negative public opinion against Congress does not 
manifest itself in rotation of membership because voters 
are content with the relationship they have with their 
personal representatives. 
Conclusion 
This has been an introductory study of term 
limitation history and early rota~ion theory in this 
country. It attempted to provide two elements of merit. 
First, the original constitution~l debate over the value 
of turnover in Congress and the necessity of automatic 
rotation provisions were analyzed to provide 
understanding of term limitation theory. Second, trends 
in congressional rotation and the contemporary term 
limitation movement were examined in the context of that 
founding theory. 
This thesis began by establishing the commonality of 
term limitations and the institution of the rotation 
principle in the pre-Constitution era. Then, the 
contending rotation theories of the Federalists and Anti-
federalists were examined and the most elemental 
differences were determined. Finally, this stu~y traced 
congressional rotation over time and examined the recent 
term limitation campaign, both within the framework of 
the original debate. The conclusions drawn from this 
study are: 
1. The rotation principle was well established at 
the time the Constitution was drafted. 
-
2. The use of term limitations was, at one time, 
common in America, especially in the states but also 
under the Articles of Confederation. 
3. Term limitations were expunged from national 
politics during the Constitutional Convention. 
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4. The value of rotation in Congress was vigorously 
contested during the ratification debates. 
5. The Anti-federalists held rotation as an ideal, 
necessary to maintain government accountability, and 
therefore, endorsed term limitations. 
6. The Federalists opposed mandatory rotation, 
arguing that it deprived Congress of valuable qualities 
and that r.e-eligibility would provide accountability. 
7. Rotation in Congress has slowed over time as 
congressional careers have 'lengthened. 
8. The contemporary term limitation movement differs 
from the campaign of the Anti-federalist, both in its 
motivations and its support base. 
9. Re-eligibility has created a relationship in 
which congressmen are forced to please the voters, which 
they have done most efficiently through pork barrel 
politics and case work. 
10. Public dissatisfaction with .Congress, the 
institution, has not translated into congressional 
rotation due to the effects of re-eligibility. 
The Anti-federalists strongly believed that 
automatic rotation was needed to offset the vulnerable 
side of human nature. In supporting term limitations, 
they were Milling to sacrifice the sanctity of public 
choice. The Federalists believed that rotation should be 
left in the hands of the voters. Re-eligibility would 
motivate representatives to always act in the public's 
interest. For the Federalists, elections were the 
mechanism by which unfavored public officials were 
removed, not term limitations. 
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Term limitations are instruments aimed at modifying 
the character of Congress. That is true of Anti-
federalist theory as well as that of modern supporters. 
In as much as term limitations apply to individual 
legislators, their ramifications would be felt most in 
the basic institution of representation. The use of term 
limitations would redirect the focus of representative 
behavior. With the stimulus of re-eligibility, 
congressmen are motivated by re-election to always work 
to please the voters. Und~r the restrictions of term 
limitations and without a provision fo~ re-eligibility, 
that incentive is not there. Congressmen would be less 
concerned with winning the favor of the voters, 
decreasing their dedication to pork barrel politics and 
intensive case work. Therefore, implementatiqn of term 
limitations would redefine the fundamental principle of 
representation. 
The paradox presented in this study was resolved by 
the application of the Federalist's theory on re-
eligibility. While the public maintains a negative 
opinion of Congress, they continue to return'their 
congressmen to Washington. This phenomena was captured 
by the "throw the rascals out, except for mine" theory. 
This paradoxical relationship suggests that recent public 
support to implement term limitations on Congress has 
targeted entrenchment of officials as an evil in itself, 
and not necessarily the consequences of long-term 
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congressional service. 
An interesting event has occurred then, if as 
concluded, term limitations are being promoted because of 
a fundamental disrelish for entrenchment of elected 
officials. It implies that there has been a resurgence 
of the original constitutional debate in which the 
Federalists argued for re-eligibility ~gainst the Anti-
federalists who held rotation as an ideal in itself. As 
the arguments grows louder and the viewpoints intensify, 
students of constitutional theory can enjoy a re-
enactment of the founding debates. 
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